









We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage
politics. The society consists of rich and poor. The rich are initially in power, but expect to
transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment
of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and
capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the
inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient
state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When the poor come to
power in democracy, they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher
taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when
the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who
set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats. We obtain that the rich–bureaucrats coalition
may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support.
The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is
greater income inequality, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values, and when individuals
are sufficiently forward-looking. (JEL: P16, H11, H26, H41)
1. Introduction
There are large cross-country differences in the extent of bureaucratic corruption
and the efficiency of the state organization (see for example World Bank 2004). An
influential argument, dating back at least to Tilly (1990), maintains that differences in
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“state capacity” are an important determinant of economic development.1 The evidence
that many less-developed economies in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America
only have a small fraction of their GDP raised in tax revenue and invested by the
government (see for example Acemoglu 2005) and the correlation between measures
of state capacity and economic growth (see for example Rauch and Evans 2000) are
consistent with this view as well. Societies with limited state capacity also tend to
be those that invest relatively little in public goods and do not adopt policies that
redistribute resources to the poor.2
In this paper, we construct a political economy model linking the emergence and
persistence of inefficient states to the strategic use of patronage politics by the elite
as a means of capturing democratic politics. Democratic capture enables the elite to
limit the provision of public goods and redistribution, but at the cost of aggregate
inefficiencies. Our approach therefore provides a unified answer to the questions of:
(i) why inefficient states emerge in some societies;
(ii) what explains the prevalence of patronage politics and its association with greater
inefficiencies in bureaucracy; and
(iii) why many democracies pursue relatively pro-elite policies.
Our model also suggests a potential reason why certain democracies may exhibit
relatively poor economic performance and adopt various inefficient policies.
We consider an infinite-horizon economy consisting of two groups, the rich elite
and poor citizens. Linear taxes can be imposed on both groups, with the proceeds used
to finance public good investments. The rich are opposed to high levels of taxes and
public good investments. Tax collection requires that the state employs bureaucrats
to prevent individuals from evading taxes, but bureaucrats themselves also need to be
given incentives so that they exert effort (or do not accept bribes). The efficiency with
which a central authority can monitor the bureaucrats is our measure of the organization
of the state. Political competition is modeled either by assuming the existence of two
parties, respectively aligned with the rich and the poor, or by allowing free entry
into the political arena by citizen-candidates (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and
Coate 1997). In both cases, there is no commitment to policies before elections and
the party that comes to power chooses the policy vector, consisting of taxes, public
good provision, and bureaucratic wages, and whether to reform the efficiency of the
state institutions. Democratic political competition is made interesting by the fact that
bureaucrats may support either the rich or poor parties (candidates) and their support
may be pivotal in the outcome of elections.3
1. See, for example, Evans 1995; Levi 1989; Migdal 1988; Epstein 2000; Herbst 2000; Centeno 2002;
Kohli 2004.
2. See, for example, Etzioni-Halevy (1983) on the importance of state capacity and bureaucratization for
the development of the welfare state in the West, and Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) on the importance of
state capacity for income redistribution.
3. In the main analysis we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (where strategies only depend on payoff-
relevant state variables). This equilibrium concept implies that there is no commitment to policies before
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There are two possible organizations of the state: the first is an efficient
organization, in which bureaucrats will be detected easily if they fail to exert effort,
while the second is an inefficient one in which monitoring bureaucrats is difficult. In
equilibrium, when the state is inefficient, bureaucrats need to be paid rents in order to
induce them to perform their roles of tax collection and inspection. The presence of
rents creates the possibility of patronage politics, whereby bureaucrats may support
the party that will maintain the inefficient structure.
In a society that is always dominated by the rich elite or that is permanently in
democracy (with a poor citizen as the median voter), the political process produces an
efficient organization of bureaucracy, since an inefficient state creates additional costs
and no benefits for those holding power. Our main result is that when the society starts
out as nondemocratic (under the control of the rich elite) and is expected to transition
to democracy, the rich may find it beneficial to choose an inefficient organization of the
state so as to exploit patronage politics to limit redistribution. In particular, bureaucrats
realize that once the poor come to power in democracy, there will be bureaucratic
reform, reducing their rents. Therefore, if the rich elite, when in power, choose an
inefficient organization of the state, the current bureaucrats—who are receiving rents—
prefer to support the rich rather than vote with the poor. Consequently, an inefficient
state organization emerges as a political instrument for the rich elite to capture the
democratic decision-making process by fostering a coalition between themselves and
the bureaucrats. It is also noteworthy that the inefficient state not only emerges in
equilibrium, but also persists; when the state is inefficient, the bureaucrats vote for
the party of the rich, which chooses not to reform the bureaucracy and continues to
maintain the support of the existing bureaucrats and thus its political power.
Our analysis shows that patronage politics can lead not only to the emergence
and persistence of an inefficient state but also to the overemployment of bureaucrats.
This is because the rich may prefer to hire additional (unnecessary) bureaucrats so
as to boost their party’s votes. Consequently, a captured democracy will typically
feature an inefficient state (bureaucracy), provide relatively few public goods, and
employ an excessive number of bureaucrats. This pattern of bureaucratic inefficiency
is consistent with the stylized view of corrupt and low-capacity bureaucracies in many
less-developed countries (Geddes 1991; Rauch and Evans 2000).4
Two factors are important in the result that the rich distort the efficiency of the
state organization in order to gain political advantage in democracy. The first is that
the efficiency of the state (bureaucracy) is a state variable, meaning that the rules
elections and thus enables us to illustrate the logic of patronage politics in the clearest fashion. Section 4.1
shows that similar results hold when we focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
4. Even with the overemployment of bureaucrats, bureaucrats and the rich elite are unlikely to have an
absolute majority in the electorate, and we do not imply that this channel alone will be sufficient for the
elite to control democratic politics. Instead, our objective is to focus on a specific mechanism of democratic
capture by the elite to highlight how it functions and what its implications are. In practice, as discussed
further in what follows, the elite may be able to gain additional influence using other, complementary
methods such as lobbying, vote buying, or use of paramilitaries. In addition, the lower turnout rates of
relatively poor individuals may further limit the political power of parties favoring redistributive policies
(Be´nabou 2000).
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and regulations governing bureaucrats’ behavior and monitoring cannot be reformed
immediately. Instead, it will take some time (in our model one period) for these reforms
to take effect. We view this as a good approximation to reality, where institutional
variables are endogenously determined and can be changed, but often with some
delay or sluggishness.5 The second and more important ingredient for this result is
that the rich elite can credibly commit to an inefficient state, which provides rents
to current bureaucrats. A party representing the preferences of the median voter (a
relatively poor agent) cannot make such a credible commitment, however. This feature
emerges as part of the equilibrium; when a party representing the preferences of the
poor comes to power it will be in its interest to reform the bureaucracy in order to
be able to increase tax revenues, thus it cannot make a credible commitment to an
inefficient state. In contrast, the party representing the preferences of the rich can
do so because its disproportionate effect on democratic politics crucially depends on
the persistence of the inefficient state. It is this differential (equilibrium) commitment
power of the rich and the poor that leads to the emergence of an inefficient state
and to the coalition between the rich and the bureaucrats, limiting redistribution in
democracy.
The comparative static results of our model shed light on the conditions under
which an inefficient state may emerge. Most importantly, greater (pre-tax) inequality
makes the emergence and persistence of an inefficient state more likely. This is because
greater inequality raises the equilibrium tax rate in democracy and makes it more
appealing for the rich to create an inefficient state apparatus to prevent democratic
outcomes. An inefficient state also requires intermediate levels of rents/efficiency
wages for bureaucrats; when rents are limited, bureaucrats would not support the rich,
while too high rents would make the inefficient state equilibrium prohibitively costly
for the rich elite. Finally, an inefficient state is more likely to arise when agents are
more forward-looking, because bureaucrats support the inefficient state in order to
obtain future rents.
It is worth emphasizing that in our model patronage politics and the creation
of an inefficient state are the only way for the rich to increase their votes and
influence in politics. We certainly do not argue or believe that there are no other,
complementary methods of democratic capture. Instead, our purpose is to isolate
a particular mechanism that appears to be important in practice and investigate
its implications. Other methods via which a rich elite may have disproportionate
effect in a democracy include lobbying, vote buying, co-optation of a subgroup of
the population, and use of force and paramilitaries. Co-optation in general plays
a role similar to that of patronage politics in our model and may be important in
practice, but only a few papers have investigated how co-optation affects political
equilibria. Our mechanism can be interpreted as an example of co-optation, though
5. This feature plays a role in the analysis, since strategies in Markov Perfect Equilibria can be conditioned
on the current organization of the state. It is no longer necessary when we focus on Subgame Perfect
Equilibria.
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it is not a specific social or ethnic group that is being co-opted and equilibrium co-
optation is only possible when the structure of the state is distorted in an inefficient
manner.6
Brazil provides a typical example of a society where the state sector has been
relatively inefficient and democratic politics has generated only limited public goods
and benefits for the poor, and illustrates the forces emphasized by our analysis. It
is generally agreed that the distribution of large numbers of public jobs, both in the
public administration and in parastatal organizations, has created a pattern of patronage
politics in Brazil (see for example Gay 1990; Evans 1992; Weyland 1996; Roett 1999).
The control over these jobs appears to have enabled traditional elites to preserve their
political power and limit the amount of public good provision and redistribution.
Cohen (1987) argues that the origins of state expansion in Brazil lie precisely with
the attempts of the elite to control politics following World War II, when transition to
democracy in Brazil became inevitable. He describes this episode and its aftermath
as follows: “During the relatively peaceful transition to democracy between 1943 and
1945, the political elite used the resources of this greatly expanded state to forge
the broad electoral coalition that would allow it to perpetuate its power in the future
regime” (p. 49). Consistent with this picture of Brazilian politics, patronage relations
have also ensured that even those in the poorest neighborhoods of Rio have supported
the traditional parties rather than socialist or social democratic parties running on
platforms of greater public good provision and redistribution (Gay 1990). Roett (1999)
emphasizes the role of public sector employees in this process and writes that “state
company employees emerged as being among the strongest supporter of the patrimonial
order” . In return, successive governments have withstood external pressures from the
IMF and have not reformed the public sector, despite the “public perception that
public-sector workers were overpaid and underworked” (Roett, p. 97). The process
of reforming the public sector in Brazil has started only recently and progressed
slowly.
Our paper is related to a number of different literatures, though we are not aware of
other papers that derive an equilibrium explanation for the various inefficiencies in the
organization of bureaucracies and provide a range of comparative statics showing when
such inefficiencies are more likely. The political science and sociology literature on the
organization of the state and the bureaucracy mentioned previously discusses related
issues, but does not provide formal models or emphasize the mechanisms we focus on
in this paper. The small economics literature on the internal organization of the state
and bureaucracy, for example Acemoglu and Verdier (1998), Dixit (2002), Egorov and
Sonin (2005) and Debs (2006), does not investigate the relationship between patronage
politics and the emergence of the inefficient state as a method of limiting redistribution.
6. We are only aware of two papers on co-optation in political economy, Gershenson and Grossman
(2001) and Bertocchi and Spagat (2001), neither of which focuses on the questions or the mechanisms
emphasized here. Lobbying is discussed extensively in the literature, but typically not in the context of
democratic capture and inefficient state structures.
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Acemoglu (2005) and Besley and Persson (2009) are complementary to our approach,
since they emphasize the importance of state capacity.
The literature on the inefficiency of the form of redistribution is also related to our
work. Wilson (1990) and Becker and Mulligan (2003) argue that inefficient methods
of redistribution are chosen as a way of limiting the amount of redistribution (see
also Coate and Morris 1995; Rodrik 1995; Saint-Paul 1996; Acemoglu and Robinson
2001).7 However, these papers do not model or explain how an existing elite can capture
democratic politics by creating an inefficient state structure or provide a mechanism
for patronage politics.8
Most closely related to our work is the small literature on how politicians may
distort policies for strategic reasons. Papers in this literature include models where
inefficient policies are chosen in order to gain votes (see for example Fiorina and Noll
1978; Geddes 1991; Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Lizzeri and Persico 2001; Robinson and
Torvik 2005). Other papers focus on how certain inefficient choices (including wasteful
investments, large budget deficits, and inefficient fiscal systems) could be made in order
to constrain future politicians (see for example Glazer 1989; Persson and Svensson
1989; Tabellini and Alesina 1990; Aghion and Bolton 1990; Cukierman, Edwards, and
Tabellini 1992; Biais and Perotti 2002). Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992)
has the most closely related focus to our paper, since, as in the papers by Wilson and
Becker and Mulligan mentioned above, they also emphasize the role of an inefficient
tax system in limiting future redistribution. As in those papers, however, there is no
explanation for why there can be commitment to the tax system but not to the level
of taxes. The main contribution of our model relative to all of these papers is the
idea that the rich elite, who need the support of the bureaucracy, can make a credible
commitment to keeping an inefficient state, while the poor, who wish to raise greater
tax revenues, cannot credibly commit to such a policy. More generally, none of these
papers derive a rationale for patronage politics or feature the mechanism of an elite
creating an inefficient state structure to maintain their political power in the face of an
emerging democracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic economic
and political environment. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 briefly
discusses a number of extensions. Section 5 concludes, while the Appendix contains
all the proofs.
7. Note, however, that there is an important distinction between our theory and the basic Becker–
Mulligan–Wilson story. In the latter, it is not clear why the society can commit to the form of redistribution
and not to the amount of redistribution. In contrast, in our model the choice of an inefficient bureaucracy
is an equilibrium strategy for affecting the future political equilibrium so as to bring the party aligned with
the interests of the rich to political power, and via this channel, to limit the provision of public goods and
taxation.
8. Another related paper is Alesina and Drazen (1991), who suggest an explanation for delayed reform
due to a war-of-attrition between different groups. Our theory provides an explanation for lack of reform
based on democratic capture by the elite.
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2. Basic Model
2.1. Description of the Economic Environment
Consider the following discrete-time infinite-horizon economy populated by a








t + Gt − he jt
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at time t = 0, where E0 is the expectation at time t = 0, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, cjt ≥ 0 denotes the consumption of the agent in question (agent j), Gt ≥ 0 is
the level of public good enjoyed by all agents, e jt ∈ {0, 1} is the effort decision of the
agent (which will be necessary in some occupations), and h > 0 is the cost of effort.
There are two types of agents: n > 1/2 are poor (low-skill), while 1 − n are
rich (high-skill). We denote poor agents by the symbol L (corresponding to low-
productivity), and rich agents by H, and also use L and H to denote the set of poor
and rich agents.
There are two occupations: producer and bureaucrat. In each period, as long as
some amount of investment in infrastructure, K > 0, is undertaken, each producer
generates an income depending on his skill; AL for poor agents and AH > AL for rich
agents. If the investment in infrastructure K is not undertaken at time t, then no agent
can produce within that period.9 Producers receive and consume their income net of
taxes.
A set of agents denoted by Xt are bureaucrats at time t. These agents do not
produce, but receive a net wage of wt ≥ 0 from the government (that is, they do not pay
taxes on their wage income, which is simply a normalization). The role of bureaucrats
is tax collection. In particular, we will allow for a linear tax rate τt ∈ [0, 1] on earned
incomes in order to finance the infrastructure investment K, additional spending on the
public good Gt, and the wages of bureaucrats. This tax rate is the same regardless of
whether the individual is rich or poor. To simplify the discussion, we assume that only
poor agents can become bureaucrats. This assumption is not necessary for the results,
since it will be evident in what follows that low-productivity poor agents always prefer
bureaucracy more than do high-productivity rich agents.
Both rich and poor agents can try to evade taxes. We assume that if an individual
tries to evade taxes, he gets caught with probability p (xt ), where p : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
is an increasing, twice continuously differentiable, and strictly concave function with
p (0) = 0, and xt denotes the number of bureaucrats exerting positive effort at time
9. While the level of K is not important for our results (and we could set K = ε > 0 for ε arbitrarily
small), it is important that bureaucrats undertake productive activities, since otherwise the rich cannot
commit to employing bureaucrats once they are in power.
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t d j . This expression incorporates the
fact that bureaucrats who do not exert effort are not useful.10
If an individual is caught evading taxes, all of his income during that period is lost.
For simplicity, we assume that this income does not accrue to the government either.11
We also assume that there is limited liability, so that cjt ≥ 0, and anonymity, so that
the past history of individual producers is not observed and future punishments on tax
evaders are not possible.
Since effort is costly, bureaucrats will exert effort only if their compensation
depends on their effort decision. We assume that if they do not exert effort, bureaucrats
are caught with probability qt at time t. If they are not caught, they receive the wage
wt, and if they are caught shirking, they lose their wage, but are not fired from the
bureaucracy.12 This assumption simplifies the exposition and is relaxed in Section 4.2.
The probability of detection qt depends on the organization of the state. We
allow two types of organizations, represented by It ∈ {0, 1}, which correspond to
different types/degrees of monitoring within the bureaucracy. In particular, we assume
q (I = 1) = 1, so that one of the possible organizations of the state allows for perfect
monitoring of bureaucrats. In contrast, q (I = 0) = q0 < 1, so that the alternative
organization involves an imperfect monitoring technology and shirking bureaucrats
are not necessarily detected. Clearly, imperfect monitoring will lead to equilibrium
distortions, and for this reason we refer to I = 0 as an inefficient organization of the
state and to I = 1 as efficient state. To simplify the analysis we assume that I = 1 has
no cost relative to I = 0.13
At each date, the political system chooses the following policies: (i) a tax rate on
all earned income τt ∈ [0, 1]; (ii) the wage rate for bureaucrats wt ∈ R+; (iii) a level
of public good Gt ∈ R+; (iv) the number of bureaucrats hired, Xt ∈ [0, 1]; and (v) the
efficiency of the state for the next date, It ∈ {0, 1}; the efficiency of the state at the
current date, I t−1, is part of the state variable, determined by choices in the previous
period. These policies must satisfy the government budget constraint (specified in what
follows), and we also make the following assumption to simplify the exposition: if
Xt ≥ Xt−1, then existing bureaucrats cannot be fired (but each bureaucrat can decide
to quit if he finds this beneficial); if Xt < Xt−1, then no new bureaucrats are hired
and a fraction (Xt − Xt−1) /Xt of the bureaucrats is fired (those fired being randomly
10. Alternatively, instead of inducing bureaucrats to exert effort, it may be important to ensure that they
do not accept bribes from the individuals supposed to pay taxes (see for example Acemoglu and Verdier
1998, 2000). We investigate a variant of our model with corruption in Section 4.4.
11. This is not an important assumption, since there is no tax evasion in equilibrium.
12. Bureaucrats also do not receive their wage if the investment in infrastructure, K, is not undertaken,
since in this case there is no production and thus no government revenue. This event does not take place
along the equilibrium path. Moreover, since there is a continuum of agents, no individual takes into
account whether his decision to enter or quit bureaucracy will have an effect on government revenues and
the financing of the investment in infrastructure.
13. In general, one can imagine that setting up a more efficient state apparatus may involve additional
expenditures. We ignore those both to simplify the algebra and also to highlight that inefficient states can
arise even when an efficient organization is costlessly available.
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chosen irrespective of their past history).14 We denote a vector of policies satisfying
these restrictions by ρt ≡ (τt , wt , Gt , Xt , It ) ∈ R.
2.2. Description of the Political System
We will consider three different political environments: (i) Permanent Nondemocracy:
the rich elite are in power at all dates, meaning that only the rich can vote, and since
all rich agents have the same policy preferences over the available set of policies, the
policy vector most preferred by a representative rich elite will be implemented. (ii)
Permanent Democracy: the citizens, who form the majority, are in power at all dates
starting at t = 0 (or at all dates there are elections as described in what follows). (iii)
Emerging Democracy: the rich elite are in power at t = 0, and in all future dates, the
regime will be democratic with majoritarian elections.
The first two environments are for comparison. The third one is our main focus in
this paper. It is a simple way of capturing the idea that some decisions are originally
taken by elites, anticipating that democracy will arrive at some point—in this case
right at date t = 1.15
To start with, we model the democratic system in a very simple way, by assuming
that there are two parties, one run by a poor agent and one run by an elite agent, and
that bureaucrats cannot run for office. We use the symbols P and R to denote these
parties and dt = P denotes that party P is elected to office at date t. Parties are unable
to make commitments to the policies they will implement once they come to power.
Thus whichever party receives the majority of the votes comes to power and the agent
in control of the party chooses the policy vector that maximizes his own utility. This
last assumption departs from the standard Downsian models of political competition
where parties commit to their policy platform before the election (see Section 4.3 for
further discussion).
2.3. Timing of Events
To recap, the timing of events within each date is as follows. The society starts
with some political regime, nondemocracy or democracy, that is, st ∈ {N , D} , a set
Xt−1 ⊂ L of agents who are already bureaucrats (since, by assumption, the set of
bureaucrats Xt−1 must be a subset of the set of poor agents), and a level of efficiency
of the state, It−1 ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the following occurs.
14. We adopt this restriction to simplify the discussion and the notation. The same results apply if the
party in power can choose, without any restrictions, who the bureaucrats will be, but in this case we have
to specify the exact identity of those in bureaucracy at each date as part of the policy vector.
15. In this case, the society is nondemocratic at date t = 0, and we assume that it will become democratic
for exogenous reasons at date t = 1. It is possible to model democratization as equilibrium institutional
change along the lines of the models of endogenous democratization in the literature (for a discussion
and references see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), but doing so would complicate the analysis without
generating additional economic insights in the current context.
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(1) In democracy, all individuals j ∈ [0, 1] vote for either party P or party R, that
is, individual j decides v jt ∈ {P, R}. Whichever party receives the majority of
the votes is elected to office. To simplify the discussion, we assume that if both
parties receive exactly half of the votes, party R is elected.
(2) The elected party (in democracy) or the representative elite agent (in
nondemocracy) decides the policy vector ρt ≡ (τt , wt , Gt , Xt , It ) ∈ R.
(3) Observing this vector, each individual j /∈ Xt−1 decides whether to apply to
become a bureaucrat, χ jt ∈ {0, 1}, and each individual j ∈ Xt−1 decides whether
to quit bureaucracy, χ jt ∈ {0, 1} (which is denoted by the same symbol without
any risk of confusion). Naturally, by assumption, χ jt = 0 for all the rich agents.




t d j}, that is, the
minimum of the number of bureaucrats chosen by the polity in power and the
number of people applying to or remaining in bureaucracy. This also determines
the current set of bureaucrats, Xt .





t d j , and thus the probability of detection of individuals evading
taxes.
(5) Production takes place and each producer decides whether to evade taxes or not,
denoted by z jt ∈ {0, 1}.
(6) A fraction p (xt ) of producers evading taxes are caught.
(7) A fraction qt = q (It−1) of shirking bureaucrats are caught and punished.
(8) Taxes are collected, remaining bureaucrats are paid their wage, wt, and the public
good Gt is supplied.
Naturally, the society starts with X−1 = ∅, that is, at the initial date there are no
incumbent bureaucrats. We also suppose that I −1 = 0 (though this has no bearing on
any of our results except the actions at time t = 0, since the choice of It ∈ {0, 1} is
without any costs).
3. Characterization of Equilibria
3.1. Definition of Equilibrium
In this section, we focus on pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). In our
model, MPE will be unique and relatively straightforward to characterize. In addition,
the focus on MPE makes the emergence of a coalition between the rich and the
bureaucrats more difficult (since there cannot be commitment to future rents for
bureaucrats). Subgame perfect equilibria are discussed in Section 4.1.
Recall that Markovian strategies condition only on the payoff-relevant state
variables (and on the prior actions within the same stage game). A MPE is defined
as a set of Markovian strategies that are best responses to each other given every
history. In the current game, the aggregate state vector can be represented as St ≡
(st , It−1, Xt−1) ∈ S, where st ∈ {N , D} is the political regime at time t, It−1 ∈ {0, 1}
is the efficiency of the bureaucracy inherited from the previous period, and Xt−1 is the
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size of the bureaucracy inherited from the previous period.16 Individual actions will be
a function of the aggregate state vector St and the individual’s identity, in particular,
at ∈ {L , H, B} representing whether the individual is a poor producer, rich producer
or a bureaucrat. Thus as a function of St and at, each individual will decide which
party to vote for, that is, v jt ∈ {P, R}, whether to apply (or to remain) in bureaucracy,
χ
j
t ∈ {0, 1}, whether to evade taxes, z jt ∈ {0, 1}, if the individual is a producer, and
whether to exert effort, e jt ∈ {0, 1}, if the individual is a bureaucrat. Finally, strategies
also include the choice of It ∈ {0, 1}, τt ∈ [0, 1] , Xt ∈ [0, n], and Gt ∈ R+ when the
individual is the party leader. Thus Markovian strategies can be represented by the
following mapping:
σ : S × {L , H, B} → {P, R} × {0, 1}4 × [0, 1] × [0, n] × R+.
A MPE is a mapping σ ∗ that is best response to itself at every possible history. In
addition, we impose the natural restriction that in the voting stage no agent uses
weakly dominated strategies and this qualification is implicit in our notion of MPE.17
We often refer to subcomponents of σ rather than the entire strategy profile,
and with a slight abuse of notation, we use v (I |a) to denote the voting strategy
of an individual of group a ∈ {L , H, B} as a function of the efficiency of the state
institutions. Moreover, when there is no risk of confusion, we use the index j to denote
individuals or groups interchangeably.
3.2. Preliminary Results
Let us first note that if p (xt ) < τt , then all producers will evade taxes at time t, that is,
z
j
t = 0 for all j /∈ Xt . This follows from the fact that by anonymity, the continuation
value of a producer caught evading taxes is the same as that of a producer paying taxes.
This observation combined with limited liability implies that the decision to evade
taxes depends on whether post-tax income (1 − τt ) A j is greater than expected income
from evasion, (1 − p (xt )) A j (taking into account that tax evaders are caught with
probability p (xt )). Since with tax evasion there is no government revenue, this implies
that in equilibrium we need to have the following incentive compatibility constraint
for producers,
p (xt ) ≥ τt ,
16. In addition, for each individual we could specify whether the individual is currently a bureaucrat,
that is, whether j ∈ Xt−1 and whether he is a party leader as part of the individual-specific state vector.
Nevertheless, Markovian strategies can be defined without doing this, which simplifies the notation.
17. Without this restriction, as in other voting games, there will exist equilibria in which all agents (in
particular, poor agents) use weakly dominated strategies and vote for the party that gives them lower utility.
Focusing on strategies that are not weakly dominated is standard practice in such games and is without
loss of any economic insight.
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to be satisfied. Alternatively, defining π (τ ) ≡ p−1 (τ ), producers’ incentive
compatibility constraint can be expressed as18
xt ≥ π (τt ) . (1)
This condition requires the number of bureaucrats exerting effort to be greater than
π (τt ). This constraint is sufficient to ensure that all individuals choose not to evade
taxes. Since p (·) is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly concave,
π (·) is strictly increasing, continuously differentiable and strictly convex.
Next, a similar argument gives the following incentive compatibility constraint for
the bureaucrats:
wt ≥ hqt , (2)
where qt = q (It−1). This constraint is necessary and sufficient to ensure that all
bureaucrats choose to exert effort.19 Moreover, since bureaucrats are necessary to
prevent tax evasion and some amount of taxation is necessary for the investment in
infrastructure, every allocation must satisfy (2).
Finally, in equilibrium (poor) individuals must prefer to become bureaucrats. This
requires the following participation constraint:
wt ≥ (1 − τt ) AL + h, (3)
which imposes that bureaucrats receive at least as much as they would obtain in private
production.20
This discussion immediately establishes the following lemma (proof omitted).
LEMMA 1. In any MPE, conditions (1), (2) and (3) must hold and ejt = 1 for all j ∈ Xt
and all t, and zjt = 1 for all j /∈ Xt and all t.
In other words, in any equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraints of
producers and bureaucrats and the participation constraint of bureaucrats are satisfied,
and no producer evades taxes and all bureaucrats exert effort. This also implies that as
long as the constraints (1) and (2) are satisfied, the government budget constraint can
be written as
K + Gt + wt Xt ≤ (1 − n) τt AH + (n − Xt ) τt AL , (4)
18. This condition can also be interpreted as a state capacity constraint since, given the effective size of
the bureaucracy, it determines the maximum tax rate.
19. This incentive compatibility constraint exploits the fact that bureaucrats caught shirking are not fired.
Then by shirking a bureaucrat saves the effort cost h and incurs the expected cost of qtwt. We show in
Section 4.2 that our main results do not depend on the assumption that bureaucrats cannot be fired.
20. If rich agents could become bureaucrats, the equivalent participation constraint, corresponding to
(3), for rich agents would be wt ≥ (1 − τt )AH + h. Clearly, poor agents are always more willing to enter
bureaucracy than rich agents. Our assumption that rich agents cannot become bureaucrats therefore enables
us to avoid imposing explicit conditions to ensure that this inequality is not satisfied and (3) is.
In addition, because as noted in footnote 12, individuals are infinitesimal and thus do not take into account
the implications of their occupational choice on government revenue, no individual would accept to work
in bureaucracy at a wage that does not satisfy (3).
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where the left-hand side is government expenditures, consisting of the investment
in infrastructure, spending on public goods and bureaucrats’ wages, while the right-
hand side is total government tax receipts. This expression takes into account that
all bureaucrats exert effort and no producer evades taxes. Moreover, (4) highlights
that in our model, taxation reduces output through a particular general equilibrium
mechanism; the government can raise taxes only by hiring bureaucrats and bureaucrats
themselves do not produce any output.
Finally, the following lemma is immediate and is also stated without proof.
LEMMA 2. Rich agents always vote for party R, that is, for all j ∈ H, v jt = R, and
poor producers always vote for party P, that is, for all j ∈ L and j /∈ Xt−1, v jt = P .
3.3. Equilibria under Permanent Democracy and Nondemocracy
Equilibria under permanent democracy and permanent nondemocracy are of interest
as a comparison to our main political environment, which involves the society starting
as nondemocratic and then transitioning to democracy. The following results are
straightforward and as with all remaining lemmas and propositions, the proofs are
provided in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1. Under permanent democracy, there exists a unique MPE. In this
equilibrium, dt = P at each t ≥ 0, and the following policy vector is implemented at
each t > 0:
It = 1, wt = (1 − τ D)AL + h, Xt = π(τ D), and
Gt = G D ≡ (1 − n)τ D AH + [n − π(τ D)]τ D AL − [(1 − τ D)AL + h]π(τ D) − K ,
(5)
where τD is the unique solution to the maximization problem,
max
τ,G
(1 − τ )AL + G
subj. to: G = (1 − n)τ AH + [n − π(τ )]τ AL − [(1 − τ )AL + h]π(τ ) − K . (6)
The next proposition provides analogous results and shows that the organization
of the state will be efficient under permanent nondemocracy.
PROPOSITION 2. Under permanent nondemocracy, there exists a unique MPE. In this
equilibrium, the following policy vector is implemented at each t > 0:
It = 1, wt = (1 − τ N )AL + h, Xt = π(τ N ), Gt = G N ≡ 0,
and τN is the unique solution to the equation
[(1 − τ )AL + h]π(τ ) − (1 − n)τ AH − [n − π(τ )]τ AL + K = 0. (7)
The main conclusion from both of these benchmark political environments is
that the politically decisive agents choose a policy vector consistent with their own
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interests, and this always involves an efficient organization of the state, that is, It =
1 for all t ≥ 0. There is no reason to make the state inefficient. Consequently, both
consolidated democratic and nondemocratic regimes involve I = 1. Moreover, in both
regimes the capacity of the state is fully utilized in the sense that constraint (1) holds
as equality and the minimum number of bureaucrats necessary to prevent tax evasion
are employed.
It is straightforward to see that the unique solution (τ D, G D) in (6) involves
τD > 0, since infrastructure spending, K > 0, has to be financed (and for the same
reason, τN > 0 in Proposition 2). However, because raising further revenues involves
the employment of bureaucrats which is costly, it is possible that the solution to (6)
involves G D = 0. If this were the case, there would be no difference between the
political bliss points of poor and rich agents given in Propositions 1 and 2 and thus no
interesting political conflict. Consequently, we are more interested in the case where
the following condition is satisfied.
CONDITION 1. The solution to (6) involves G D > 0.
It can be verified that if the gap between AH and AL is small and π ′(τ ) is large,
this condition will be violated. Therefore, this condition imposes that there is a certain
degree of inequality in society and raising taxes is not excessively costly, so that the
poor would like a higher level of public good provision than the rich. When Condition
1 is satisfied, it also follows that τD > τN , and since π(·) is strictly increasing,
π(τ D) > π(τ N ) and the size of the bureaucracy is larger in permanent democracy
than in permanent nondemocracy. Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that
Condition 1 is satisfied.
3.4. Political Equilibrium with Regime Change
We now look at the more interesting case with regime change—that is, where at date t =
0, the rich are in power and from then on there will be elections. We start with a series
of lemmas. The following lemma establishes three useful results: (i) with efficient
state institutions, the rich will choose their political bliss point as in Proposition 2;
(ii) the party representing the poor, party P, being elected to office is an absorbing
state, so that once the party of the poor is elected, the results of Proposition 1 apply
subsequently; and (iii) the structure of equilibrium policies starting with an inefficient
state, that is, I t−1 = 0.
LEMMA 3.
1. In a MPE, if dt = R and I t−1 = 1, then wt = (1 − τ N )AL + h, Xt =
π(τ N ), Gt = G N ≡ 0, and τN is given by (7).
2. If dt = P, then dt ′ = P for all t ′ ≥ t , and equilibrium policies at all dates t ′ >
t are given by (5).
3. Suppose that I t−1 = 0, then wt = h/q0. Moreover, if dt = R, then Gt = G E ≡ 0,
and if dt = P, then Gt = ˆG D given by the solution to the following maximization




(1 − τ ) AL + G
subj. to: G = (1 − n) τ AH + [n − π (τ )] τ AL − h
q0
π (τ ) − K . (8)
The most important result is part 2 of this lemma, which establishes that party P
being elected to office is an absorbing state. The intuition for this result is as follows.
Once the party of the poor wins an election, they will choose their preferred policy
vector, which includes It = 1, and given an efficient state, bureaucrats will have no
reason to support the rich party and the poor will continue to win elections in all future
periods and the organization of the state will continue to be efficient. An efficient
organization of the state ensures that bureaucrats receive no rents and receive the same
payoff as poor producers. Thus they will also support party P, and the political bliss
point of the poor will be implemented in all future periods. This lemma also implies
that when I t−1 = 1, that is, when the state is efficient, the rich will not be able to win
a majority. This is related to the basic idea of our approach: the rich can only convince
bureaucrats to vote for their party by committing to giving them rents and this can only
be achieved when the organization of the state is inefficient, that is, I t−1 = 0.
Given the characterization of continuation equilibria in Lemma 3, the key question
is whether the party of the rich, party R, can ever win an election starting with I t−1 =
0. The following lemma answers this question.
LEMMA 4. In a MPE, dt = R, that is, the rich will win the election at time t, if I t−1 =
0,
(1 − q0) hq0 > (1 − τ




Xt ≥ n − 12 , (10)
where G D is given by (5), ˆG D is given by (8), and τD is given by (6).
Lemma 4 determines the conditions under which the bureaucrats will support
party R (a rich agent running for office) and will be numerous enough to give them
the majority. Condition (10) requires the size of the bureaucracy to be sufficient to
give the majority to party R when all bureaucrats vote with the rich. Nevertheless,
n − 1/2 may not be the actual size of bureaucracy. In particular, at X = n − 1/2, the
government budget may not balance. To ensure that it does, we need to consider two
cases separately.
Let us first define τE as the tax rate that party R would choose as its unconstrained
optimal policy to finance the investment in infrastructure, K, given that bureaucratic
wages are equal to w = h/q0. Clearly, τE is given by the unique solution to the equation
π(τ E ) h
q0
− (1 − n)τ E AH − [n − π(τ E )]τ E AL + K = 0. (11)
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In other words, τE balances the government budget when the minimum number of
bureaucrats necessary to avoid tax evasion, X = π(τ E ), are employed.
The first case corresponds to the one where π(τ E ) ≥ n − 1/2, so that the
unconstrained optimal size of bureaucracy for party R is also sufficient to make sure
that (10) is satisfied and the rich have a majority.
The second case applies when this inequality does not hold, that is, when
π(τ E ) < n − 1/2. In this case, the unconstrained optimal policy for the rich would
not satisfy (10), and party R cannot win the election with the minimum number of
bureaucrats. Instead, party R can win an election only if X ≥ n − 1/2, and with this








− (1 − n)τˆ E AH − 1
2
τˆ E AL + K = 0. (12)
It can be verified that whenever n − 1/2 > π(τ E ), we also have τˆ E > τ E , and
whenever n − 1/2 ≤ π(τ E ), τˆ E ≤ τ E . This implies that the size of the bureaucracy
necessary for the rich to form a winning coalition is the maximum of π(τ E ) and n −
1/2, and correspondingly, the tax rate that party R needs to set is max{τ E , τˆ E }.
The results so far have provided the necessary conditions for the rich to be able to
generate sufficient votes from the bureaucrats to remain in power. It remains to check
whether the rich prefer to pursue this strategy and commit to an inefficient state in
order to maintain political power in democracy. The following lemma answers this
question.21
LEMMA 5. Suppose that (9) holds. Then the rich prefer to set It = 0 for all t if one of
the following hold:
τ E ≥ τˆ E and (τ D − τ E )AH > G D; or
τ E < τˆ E and (1 − τˆ E )AH > (1 − β)(1 − τ E )AH + β[(1 − τ D)AH + G D], (13)
where G D is given by (5), τD is given by (6), τE is given by (11), and τˆ E is given by
(12).
Now putting all these lemmas together we obtain the main result of this section.22
21. If Condition 1 were not satisfied, the conditions in Lemma 5 could never be satisfied. In particular,
when Condition 1 does not hold, we have G D = 0 and τD = τ E, so that neither part of condition (13) could
hold. This is a direct consequence of the fact that a significant conflict in policies between the rich and the
poor is necessary for the rich to set up an inefficient system of patronage politics.
22. It can be verified that the set of parameter values where It = 0 emerges as an equilibrium in Proposition
3 is nonempty. A straightforward way of doing this is to consider high values of β as in Proposition 5.
Note also that Proposition 3 does not cover the case in which one of (9) and (13) holds as equality; in this
case the MPE is no longer unique. It is straightforward to see that in such a case, either the rich or the
poor party could receive the majority of the votes, or the rich could be indifferent between maintaining an
inefficient and an efficient state. We do not describe the equilibrium in these cases to save space.
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PROPOSITION 3. Consider the political environment with emerging democracy. If (9)
and (13) hold, then there exists a unique MPE. In this equilibrium, the rich elite choose
It = 0 for all t ≥ 0, the rich party R always remains in power and the following policies
are implemented:
wt = hq0 , Xt = max{π(τ
E ), n − 1/2}, Gt = G E ≡ 0, and τt = max{τ E , τˆ E },
where τE is given by (11) and τˆ E is given by (12).
If, on the other hand, one or both of (9) and (13) hold with the reverse inequality,
the unique MPE involves It = 1 in the initial period, and for all t ≥ 1, dt = P and the
unique policy vector is given by (5).
Proposition 3 is our first major result. It establishes the possibility that the rich
elite, who are in power at time t = 0, may choose an inefficient state organization and
a large (inefficient) bureaucracy as a way of credibly committing to providing rents to
bureaucrats. This enables them to create a majority coalition consisting of themselves
and the bureaucrats, and thus capture democratic politics. This coalition implements
policies that support low redistribution and low provision of public goods, but creates
high rents for bureaucrats. Perhaps more interestingly, after t = 1, even when the
society is democratic, the inefficient state institutions persist and the rule of the rich
continue. This is in spite of the fact that at any date these inefficient institutions can be
reformed at no cost and made more efficient. The reasoning is related to the formation
of the coalition between the rich and the bureaucrats in the first place. The rich realize
that they will be able to maintain power only by keeping an inefficient state structure
and creating sufficient rents for bureaucrats. If these rents disappear, bureaucrats will
ally themselves with the poor, since their net income will be the same as the net income
of poor producers (recall parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 3). It is precisely the presence of
inefficient state institutions creating rents for the bureaucrats that induces them to
support the policies of the rich. Recognizing this, when in power the rich choose to
maintain the inefficient state structure. At the next date, the party representing the rich
receives the support of the bureaucrats and the rich; consequently, it remains in power
and the cycle continues. The model therefore generates a political economy theory for
both the emergence and the persistence of inefficient state institutions.23
It is also noteworthy that even though taxes are lower in the equilibrium with
inefficient state than they would have been under permanent democracy (recall
Proposition 1 and Lemma 5), the size of the bureaucracy can be greater than under
permanent democracy. This could be the case when the rich elite hire more bureaucrats
than necessary for preventing tax evasion in order to create a majority in favor of the
persistence of the inefficient state—that is, in the case where X > π(τ E ). In particular,
note that bureaucracy will be more numerous under the control of the elite than in
23. The nature of persistence here is different from the persistence of policies arising in Coate and Morris
(1999), Hassler et al. (2003), or Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), because the focus is not on persistence
of a certain set of collective decisions within a given institutional framework, but on the persistence of the
inefficiency of state institutions.
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democracy whenever π(τ D) < n − 1/2. Since in this case equation (13) implies that
τE < τD, we must also have π(τ E ) < π(τ D) < n − 1/2 and thus
X > π(τ E ).
Consequently, the rich not only choose an inefficient state organization, but they
also choose overemployment of bureaucrats, in the sense that bureaucracy is now
unnecessarily large and the number of bureaucrats is strictly greater than that necessary
for tax inspection. The capture of democratic politics by the rich elite therefore
creates an inefficient state, with poorly monitored and overpaid bureaucrats, and also
leads to a situation in which the capacity of the state is not fully utilized. These
inefficiencies imply that the allocation of resources in a captured democracy is worse
than in a nondemocracy (or than in a perfectly functioning democracy). Naturally, these
inefficiencies have a political rationale, which is to increase the number of bureaucrats
that will vote for the party aligned with the rich, so that the rich can maintain political
power in the future.
Interestingly, because creating an inefficient bureaucracy is more costly than
creating an efficient one (which is smaller and gives bureaucrats no rents), the citizens
are worse off in a nonconsolidated (emerging) democracy, where they are taxed at
rate max{τ E , τˆ E }, than they would be under a consolidated nondemocracy, where
they are only taxed at rate τ N < max{τ E , τˆ E }. Moreover, the rich are also worse off
in this equilibrium than they would be in a permanent nondemocracy, since they are
paying higher wages to bureaucrats and possibly employing an excessive number of
them.
3.5. Comparative Statics
We next investigate the conditions under which the equilibrium involves the emergence
and persistence of inefficient state institutions. The following proposition establishes
that a certain degree of inequality between the poor and the rich (that is, a high level
of AH/AL ), a sufficiently high discount factor, β, and intermediate bureaucratic rents,
(1 − q0)h/q0, are necessary for the emergence of inefficient state institutions.
PROPOSITION 4. Consider an economy characterized by the parameters
(β, n, AL , AH , K , h, q0) and the function p(·). Holding all other parameters constant,
we have
(1) there exists a > 1 such that if AH/AL ≤ a, then the state is always efficient, that
is, It = 1;
(2) there exist a′ > 1 and ¯β ∈ (0, 1) such that as long as AH/AL ≥ a′, β ≤ ¯β implies
It = 1;
(3) there exists θ > 0 and ¯θ such that if (1 − q0)h/q0 /∈ (θ, ¯θ), then It = 1.
The first part of the proposition implies that a certain level of inequality is necessary
for the emergence of an inefficient state. This is intuitive; with limited inequality,
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democracy will not be redistributive and it will not be worthwhile for the rich to set
up an inefficient bureaucracy in order to keep the poor away from power. The second
part implies that the high discount factor is also necessary for the emergence of the
inefficient state. This follows because bureaucrats vote for party R as an investment,
that is, to obtain higher returns in the future. Instead, if they deviate and vote for party
P, in the current period they receive both the same high wages (since It = 0) and the
positive level of public good provided by party P, ˆG D > 0. If their discount factor
were very small, it would be impossible for rich agents to convince bureaucrats to
support their party.24 Finally, the third part of the proposition implies that bureaucratic
rents need to take intermediate values. If bureaucratic rents are very small, bureaucrats
would not support the party of the rich. If they are very large, it is prohibitively costly
for the rich to control democratic politics.
While Proposition 4 shows that a certain degree of inequality is necessary for
It = 0, it does not establish that inequality has a monotonic effect on the likelihood
of an inefficient state. The next proposition establishes this result under somewhat
more restrictive assumptions. In this proposition, by greater inequality we mean
a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution in the economy, that is, a
simultaneous increase in AH and decrease in AL such that mean potential income,
Y = (1 − n)AH + n AL , remains constant.
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that π(τ ) is log-concave in τ and τD given by (6) satisfies
τ D < 1 − π(τ D) < 1. Then there exists ˜β ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β ≥ ˜β, greater
inequality makes the inefficient state equilibrium, that is, It = 0, more likely.
The proof of this proposition is long and somewhat involved. It is provided in
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2006) and we omit it here to save space. Note that
the condition that π(τ ) is log-concave is not very restrictive. For example, any p(x)
that takes the power function form, that is, p(x) = P0xα for P0 > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1),
satisfies this condition. The condition that τ D < 1 − π(τ D) < 1 is also natural; if
this condition were violated, we would have that the utility of the poor in democracy
(1 − τ D)AL + G D would be non-increasing in AL .
In addition to generalizing the first part of Proposition 4, Proposition 5 implies that
taxes (and public spending) can be higher in more equal societies, because unequal
societies are more likely to create inefficient bureaucracies to limit taxation and
public spending. This result therefore presents an alternative explanation to the often-
discussed negative cross-sectional correlation between inequality and redistribution
(see for example Perotti 1996; Be´nabou 2000).
24. Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) also obtain the result that higher discount
factors may lead to greater inefficiencies. However, in these models the source of inefficiency is very
different. In particular, inefficient political equilibria arise when pivotal agents—elites or rulers—are
sufficiently patient and thus take inefficient actions in order to secure their future political survival.
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4. Extensions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the main conclusions of our benchmark
model and a number of extensions.
4.1. Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We have so far focused on MPE. A natural question is whether similar insights apply
without the restriction to Markovian strategies. This is important since commitment
and credibility problems are at the center of our theory of emergence and persistence
of inefficient states and we like to ensure that these are not imposed artificially by the
concept of MPE.
Our brief analysis in this section shows that similar insights apply when we
focus on the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). The reason is that the elite have an
equilibrium (credible) commitment to redistributing to bureaucrats that the poor lack;
the poor cannot commit to keeping an inefficient state and paying efficiency wages
to bureaucrats, because, when in power, they will want to increase tax revenues, and
reform or downsize bureaucracy. As in the analysis so far, we maintain the assumption
of individual anonymity, which implies that individual histories are not observed and
thus future hiring decisions for bureaucracy cannot be conditioned on whether an
individual was previously a bureaucrat.
To state the main result of this section, recall the notation in Section 3.1 and let
Ht denote the set of all possible histories of the game up to stage t (which includes the
state vector S up to time t). Then a (possibly non-Markovian) strategy profile can be
represented as
σ˜ : Ht × {L , H, B} → {P, R} × {0, 1}4 × [0, 1] × [0, n] × R+,
and specifies the behavior of each type of agent (poor producer, rich producer, and
bureaucrat) as a function of history ht ∈ Ht . An SPE is a mapping σ˜ ∗ that is the
best response to itself at every possible history ht ∈ Ht . As with MPE, we rule out
weakly dominated strategies, so that an SPE refers to a strategy profile that is a best
response to itself and does not involve the play of weakly dominated strategies. The
following proposition characterizes the SPE that maximizes the date t = 0 utility of
the elite when condition (9) and (13) hold and when π(τ E ) > n − 1/2. It shows that
the best SPE from the viewpoint of the elite is qualitatively similar to the MPE in
Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 6. Consider the political environment with emerging democracy, and
suppose that conditions (9) and (13) hold and that π(τ E ) < n − 1/2, where τE is
defined as in (11). Then the SPE that maximizes the date t = 0 utility of the elite
involves a bureaucracy of size X = n − 1/2, no redistribution (G = 0), and party R
winning the election at each date.
This proposition states that, though some details of the best SPE from the
viewpoint of the elite may be different than in the MPE of Proposition 3, the
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qualitative features of the two equilibrium allocations are very similar. In both cases,
the elite are able to retain their political power in democracy and avoid redistribution.
In particular, since π(τ E ) < n − 1/2, in both cases they achieve this by creating
an oversized bureaucracy. The key intuition is once again that the poor (party P)
do not have a credible commitment to paying high salaries to bureaucrats. More
specifically, since, π(τ E ) < n − 1/2, the elite requires an oversized bureaucracy, that
is, X = n − 1/2 > π(τ E ), to win elections. This implies that as soon as party P
comes to power, its best response is to reduce the size of bureaucracy (which it can
do without violating (1)) and increase redistribution—thus increasing the utility of
the representative poor agent. Individual anonymity implies that poor agents who
were previously bureaucrats do not have a higher probability of being hired back into
bureaucracy if party R ever comes back to power. Consequently, after the downsizing
of bureaucracy, all poor agents who are currently not bureaucrats will vote for party
P, which will then reform the organization of the state (It = 1) and win all future
elections. Consequently, there is no SPE in which party P can pay efficiency wages to
bureaucrats (except possibly in the first period in which it is in power if I = 0 in that
period).
Turning to the strategies of the elite, part 3 of Lemma 3 still applies and shows that
when I t−1 = 0, any party that is in power must pay at least the minimum efficiency wage
wt = h/q0 (otherwise there will be no production). Moreover, Lemma 5 also applies
and shows that when (9) and (13) hold, the elite prefer the inefficient state equilibrium
to living under democracy. These observations imply that the elite can, and would like
to, build a large bureaucracy and hold on to power. In fact, the proof in the Appendix
shows that the elite may be able do this more cheaply than in the MPE of Proposition 3,
and the relevant condition for this is provided in the Appendix. Regardless of whether
this condition holds the important conclusion is that the SPE has a similar structure
to the MPE in Proposition 3; in particular, it involves the elite maintaining political
power, setting up an oversized bureaucracy, and preventing redistribution.
For brevity, Proposition 6 is stated for the case in which (9) and (13) hold and
π(τ E ) < n − 1/2. If π(τ E ) ≥ n − 1/2, it may be possible for party P to commit to
bureaucratic wages greater than (1 − τ D)AL + G D + h, but in any such allocation,
there will still be redistributive taxation and the elite will be worse off than in the
equilibrium of Proposition 3. Therefore, the best SPE from the viewpoint of the elite
again involves party R being in power and G = 0, though now the size of bureaucracy
may be smaller than π(τ E ). It can also be verified that if these conditions fail to hold,
there may still exist an SPE with elite control, because now the rich can promise even
a higher wage to bureaucrats. Thus, SPE may in fact involve a greater likelihood of the
emergence and persistence of an inefficient state.
4.2. Equilibrium When Bureaucrats Can Be Fired
The main result of the previous section, Proposition 3, was derived under the
assumption that bureaucrats cannot be fired when they are caught shirking. This
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simplified the analysis by enabling us to write the incentive compatibility constraint of
bureaucrats in the form of condition (2). We now allow bureaucrats to be fired when
they are caught shirking. It is clear that from the viewpoint of discouraging shirking, a
contract which commits to firing bureaucrats when they are caught shirking is optimal.
To study the structure of equilibria when bureaucrats can be fired, we focus on a
stationary equilibrium, where today and in all future periods the tax rate is equal to τˆ ,
the wage rate for bureaucrats is wˆ, and the probability of getting caught is qˆ. In this
case, if
wˆ − h
1 − β < qˆβ
(1 − τˆ )AL
1 − β + (1 − qˆ)
(




then bureaucrats would prefer to shirk. This is intuitive since the left-hand side of
this expression is what the individual would receive by exerting effort at every date,
whereas the right-hand side is the payoff to deviating for one period, and then switching
to exerting effort from then on (implicitly using the one-step ahead deviation principle,
see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Chapter 4). In particular, the right-hand side has the
individual getting caught with probability qˆ , receiving nothing today and the wage of a
low-skill producer from then on, and not getting caught with probability 1 − qˆ, in which
case he receives wˆ today and then receives the discounted version of the left-hand side
(as he switches back to exerting effort). A bureaucrat who loses his job always receives
the wage of a low-skill producer from then on, since along the equilibrium path, there
will be no further hiring into bureaucracy. Rearranging the previous expression, we
conclude that whenever the following incentive compatibility constraint is violated,
bureaucrats will shirk. The relevant incentive compatibility constraint is
wˆ ≥ β(1 − τˆ )AL + (1 − β(1 − qˆ))h
qˆ
. (14)
Given this modified incentive compatibility condition, all of the results from the
previous section apply with appropriate modifications. The following proposition can
be proved with identical arguments to those in Section 3 (see Acemoglu, Ticchi, and
Vindigni, 2006).
PROPOSITION 7. Consider the political environment with emerging democracy and
suppose that bureaucrats can be fired if caught shirking. Let G D and τD be given by
(5) and (6), τ˜ E be such that
λm
[
β(1 − τ˜ E )AL + (1 − β(1 − q0))h
q0
]
− (1 − n)τ˜ E AH − (n − λm)τ˜ E AL + K = 0,
where λm ≡ max{π(τ˜ E ), n − 1/2}, and ˆG D be given by (8) with
β(1 − τ˜ E )AL + (1 − β(1 − q0))h/q0
replacing h/q0. Suppose that
β(1 − τ˜ E )AL + (1 − β)(1 − q0)h/q0 > (1 − τ D)AL + G D + (1 − β) ˆG D/β
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and (τ D − τ˜ E )AH > G D . Then the unique MPE is as follows: the rich elite choose
It = 0 in the initial period and for all t thereafter, the rich party always remains in
power and the following policies are implemented at all dates:
wt = β(1 − τ˜ E )AL + (1 − β(1 − q0))h/q0,
Xt = max{π(τ˜ E ), n − 1/2},
Gt = G E ≡ 0, and τt = τ˜ E .
Proposition 7 demonstrates that the results in Proposition 3 generalize to the
environment where bureaucrats can be fired if caught shirking. One important
difference is worth noting, however. In our main analysis, Proposition 4 showed that
a higher discount factor, β, makes the emergence of an inefficient state more likely.
Instead, when bureaucrats can be fired, the relationship between the discount factor
and the emergence of inefficient states is more complex. Higher β again increases the
importance that bureaucrats attach to future rents, but it also reduces the level of rents,
because being fired from bureaucracy becomes more costly.
4.3. Political Equilibrium Citizen-Candidates
We have so far assumed that democracy involves competition between the two parties
representing the interests of the poor and the rich. If a party representing the interests
of bureaucrats forms, bureaucrats might vote for that party and the coalition between
the rich and the bureaucrats, choosing low public good provision and low taxes, might
not materialize.
In Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2006), we showed that all of the results in
Section 3 continue to apply when the set of parties (citizen-candidates) running for
office is endogenized, so that the bureaucrats can also form a party and contest elections.
We showed that in this extended environment the poor vote for a poor candidate and
the rich vote for a rich candidate. Moreover, when the party of the poor cannot win
an election, the poor never support the bureaucrats; instead, they vote for the party
of the rich, because a party representing the bureaucrats would impose higher taxes
but would not provide public goods (whereas the party of the rich at least sets lower
taxes). This analysis overall confirms that our theory of emergence and persistence of
inefficient states does not depend on artificially restricting the set of party platforms.
4.4. Bureaucratic Corruption
A final extension involves modifying the basic model so that the moral hazard problem
on the side of bureaucrats is not related to their effort but to whether or not they accept
bribes from producers evading taxes. This source of moral hazard problem is arguably
as important as the effort choice of bureaucrats. More importantly, this type of moral
hazard problem leads to an interesting pattern of de facto regressive taxation as a result
of successful patronage politics by the rich elite.
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Because of space restrictions, we will only sketch this extension, referring the
reader to Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2006) for details. The main difference
from our benchmark model in Section 2 is that the bureaucrats no longer have an
effort choice, but instead, they can accept bribes from producers that have evaded
taxes. The efficiency of the state, It ∈ {0, 1}, now determines whether bureaucrats
accepting bribes are caught or not. In particular, when I = 1, there is an efficient
organization of the state and corruption is detected with probability q(I = 1) = 1.
When I = 0, the state organization is inefficient and corruption is detected with
probability q(I = 0) = q0 < 1. We also assume that each bureaucrat can be matched
with at most one producer, and thus receives at most the bribe payments from a single
producer, denoted by bt ≥ 0. The incentive compatibility constraint for bureaucrats (2)
is now replaced by the following “no bribe constraint”:
wt ≥ (1 − q0)(wt + bt ), (15)
where bt is the bribe offered to the bureaucrat by a producer. Intuitively, the right
hand side of (15) represents the expected return of a bureaucrat that accepts a bribe bt,
given by the sum of the wage and the bribe, weighted by the probability of not being
detected. If condition (15) does not hold, it is not possible to prevent the corruption of
bureaucrats by producers.
Given this setup, the formal analysis parallels that in Section 3 and leads to the
following result (see Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2006 for details).
PROPOSITION 8. Consider the political environment with emerging democracy. If q0
is sufficiently small and inequality is sufficiently large, then the unique MPE is one
in which the rich elite choose It = 0 in the initial period and for all t thereafter, the
rich party R always remains in power. They provide no public goods and pay relatively
low wages to bureaucrats, so that in equilibrium the rich evade taxes and pay a bribe
equal to b = AL when inspected. The poor do not evade taxes.
The most interesting result in Proposition 8 is that, when they are able to capture
democratic politics, the rich do not pay any taxes at all. Instead, they (sometimes) pay
bribes equal to the tax burden on poor agents, AL . This implies that patronage politics
turns de jure proportional taxation into a de facto regressive one. In other words, when
the rich elite are able to set up an inefficient state and receive the support of bureaucrats,
they are not only able to limit redistribution and public good provision, but they are
also able to shift most of the burden of taxation to the poor. Consequently, the tax
rate faced by the poor may be higher when corruption is possible than in the baseline
model where both rich and poor pay taxes.
5. Concluding Remarks
Inefficiencies in the bureaucratic organization of the state are often viewed as an
important factor in retarding economic development. Many sociological accounts
of comparative development emphasize the role of state capacity (or lack thereof)
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in explaining why some societies are able to industrialize and modernize (see for
example Evans 1995; Migdal 1988). In addition, inefficient state organizations appear
to coincide with limited amounts of public good provision and redistribution towards
the poor. Existing approaches do not address the question of why certain societies
choose or end up with such inefficient organizations and do not clarify the relationship
between inefficient state organizations and limited redistribution.
We presented a simple theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states,
in which the organization of the public bureaucracy is manipulated by the rich elite
in order to influence redistributive politics. In particular, by instituting an inefficient
state structure, the elite are able to use patronage and capture democratic politics. This
enables them to limit the extent of redistribution and public good provision. Captured
democracies not only limit redistribution, but also create a number of major distortions:
the structure of the state is inefficient, there is too little public good provision and there
may be overemployment of bureaucrats.
We also showed that an inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends
to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for
bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the median (poor) agent
comes to power in democracy, he will reform the structure of the state to make it more
efficient so that the higher taxes can be collected at lower cost (especially in terms
of lower rents for bureaucrats). Anticipating this, when the organization of the state
is inefficient, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but pay high wages to
bureaucrats. In order to generate enough political support, the coalition of the rich and
the bureaucrats may not only choose an inefficient organization of the state, but they
may further expand the size of bureaucracy so as to gain additional votes.
The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely when
there is greater income inequality and when democratic taxes are anticipated to be
higher. An interesting implication of this result is that inequality and redistribution may
be negatively correlated because higher inequality makes the capture of democratic
politics more likely.
The general message from our analysis is that “not all democracies are created
equal”; while some democracies will adopt policies that redistribute to poorer segments
of the society, others may become captured by traditional elites. These captured
democracies not only choose low levels of redistribution, but, as part of their
political rationale for survival, they also typically create a range of inefficiencies.
While we focused on the emergence and persistence of inefficient state structures
in democratic or quasi-democratic polities, such inefficiencies are also present in
other systems, most notably, in socialist economies and other dictatorships. We
conjecture that the unwillingness of leaders to reform inefficient state organizations
in these regimes may also be related to their attempts to forge coalitions with
bureaucrats and state employees, who are often more powerful in these regimes than in
democracies. Other mechanisms for democratic capture and reasons for maintaining
inefficient bureaucracies in nondemocratic systems constitute fruitful areas for future
research.
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Appendix Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 2, for all j ∈ L, v jt = P . Under permanent
democracy, the poor can vote and form the majority starting at t = 0, thus
dt = P for all t. Then the payoff to the decisive voter j ′ ∈ L can be written as
V j
′
t = (1 − τ )At + Gt + βV j
′
t+1(σ ∗), where σ ∗ is the optimal policy and βV j
′
t+1(σ ∗)
is the discounted optimal continuation value. The continuation value βV j
′
t+1(σ ∗) is
unaffected by current policies, thus the optimal policy can be determined as a solution
to the following program:
max
τ,w,X,I,G
(1 − τ )AL + G





, (1 − τ )AL + h
}
≤ w,
G ≤ (1 − n)τ AH + (n − X )τ AL − wX − K ,
0 ≤ G. (A.1)
It is evident that It = 1 relaxes the second constraint relative to It = 0, so will always be
chosen for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, there cannot be a solution in which any one of the first
three constraints is slack (since this would allow an increase in G, raising the value of the
objective function), so X = π(τ ) and w = max{h, (1 − τ )AL + h} = (1 − τ )AL + h.
Substituting these equalities yields (6) for all periods where It = 1, that is, for all t >
0. Strict convexity of π(·) then ensures that τD is uniquely defined. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Under permanent nondemocracy, the rich always retain
political power and the payoff to a rich individual j ′ ∈ H can be written as
V j
′
t = (1 − τ )AH + Gt + βV j
′
t+1(σ ∗), where σ ∗ is the optimal policy and βV j
′
t+1(σ ∗)
is the continuation value, which is again unaffected by current policies. Therefore,
the optimal policy can be determined as a solution to maximizing (1 − τ )AH + G
subject to the same set of constraints as in (A.1). Once again It = 1 relaxes the second
constraint, so will always be chosen. Moreover, the first three constraints must hold as
equalities, so X = π(τ ) and w = max{h, (1 − τ )AL + h} = (1 − τ )AL + h. Finally,
in this case G = 0, and the strict convexity of π(·) again ensures the uniqueness of the
solution to (7). 
Proof of Lemma 3. Parts 1 and 3 of this lemma are straightforward and we omit the
proofs.
Part 2. The policy vector in (5) is the optimal policy of the citizens in permanent
democracy (Proposition 1). Now suppose that party P is in power at time t, and suppose
that it chooses the policy vector specified in the lemma. Since this includes It = 1,
the following period, we start with It = 1 as part of the payoff-relevant state vector.
Suppose that σ ∗ is such that v(I = 1|B) = P . Then party P wins the majority at time
t + 1. Alternatively suppose that v(I = 1|B) = P , but X < n − 1/2. Then, party P
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again wins the majority at time t + 1. In both cases, repeating this argument for the
next period shows that party P keeps power at all dates and establishes the lemma.
To complete the proof we only need to rule out the case where v(I = 1|B) = R
and X ≥ n − 1/2 (the proof to eliminate the case where bureaucrats randomize between
the two parties in a way to bring party R to power is identical). Since v(I = 1|B) = R
and I = 0 is costly for the rich, party R will choose It = 1. Then from part 1, we
obtain that wt = (1 − τ N )AL + h, Xt = π(τ N ), and Gt = G N ≡ 0. This implies that
the utility of the bureaucrat is the same as a poor producer. Then denoting the utility
of a bureaucrat supporting party d by V B(d), we have
V B (R) = (1 − τ N )AL + βV j (σ ∗) < (1 − τ D)AL + G D + βV j (σ ∗) = V B(P),
where the inequality follows because the last term is the maximal utility of a poor agent
and also the utility of a bureaucrat when party P is in power. Thus v (I = 1|B) = R
cannot be a best response. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Part 2 of Lemma 3 establishes that I t−1 = 0 is necessary. Now
suppose that I t−1 = 0 and consider the scenario in which party R chooses It = 0 and
Xt ≥ Xt−1 (so that no current bureaucrat is fired). Consider the case in which individual
j ∈ Xt is pivotal and chooses vjt = R in all future periods. Then, his net per-period




(1 − q0) h
q0
. (A.2)




− h + ˆG D + β ˆV jt+1, (A.3)
where ˆV jt+1 is the continuation value when party P is in power from then on, given by
ˆV jt+1 = [(1 − τ D)AL + G D]/(1 − β). This last expression incorporates the fact that if
the poor are in power, they reform the bureaucracy, setting It = 1, and that I = 1 is an
absorbing state.
The comparison of (A.2) and (A.3) gives (9)—as a weak inequality—as a necessary
condition for bureaucrats to support party R when they are pivotal. Condition (10) is
also necessary since, if it were violated, bureaucrats would not be pivotal and party
R would receive less than half of the votes even with all of bureaucrats voting vjt =
R. This argument establishes that both (9) and (10) are necessary. Moreover, (9)—as
a strict inequality—and (10) are also sufficient to ensure dt = R, since when both of
these conditions hold, it is a weakly dominant strategy for bureaucrats to vote for party
R whenever I t−1 = 0 and the coalition of bureaucrats and the rich have a majority. 
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose v(I = 0|B) = R (that is, bureaucrats vote for party R
whenever the state is inefficient). Under party P, the per period return of the rich is
(1 − τ D)AH + G D . When τ E ≥ τˆ E , party R can remain in power by choosing I = 0
with the per period return (1 − τ E )AH . This gives the first part of (13).
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For the second part, note that, when in power, party R can always choose its myopic
optimum, giving each rich agent utility,
V R = (1 − τ E )AH + β[(1 − τ D)AH + G D]/(1 − β).
The continuation value β[(1 − τ D)AH + G D]/(1 − β) follows from the observation
that since, by assumption, τ E < τˆ E , we have n − 1/2 > π(τ E ) and thus party R will
lose the election at the next date. Then Lemma 3 implies that party P will win all
elections in all future dates. Alternatively, party R can choose X = n − 1/2 and
guarantee to be in power forever, but at the expense of taxing the rich at the higher
rate τˆ E . This will give a representative rich agent utility ˆV R = (1 − τˆ E )AH/(1 − β).
Comparison of ˆV R with V R in the previous expression gives the second part
of (13). 
Proof of Proposition 3. The first part of the proposition follows immediately from
combining Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. When (9) or (13) does not hold, then party P is in
power and the second part of the proposition follows immediately from Lemma 3 and
Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Inspection of the maximization problem (6) immediately
shows that as AL → AH, Condition 1 will be violated and the conditions in (13) cannot
hold. Then the first result follows from Lemma 5 and Proposition 3.
For the second part, recall from the discussion of Lemma 5 that some minimal
level of inequality, say AH/AL ≥ a′, is necessary for ˆG D > 0. Suppose this is the case.
From Proposition 3, condition (9) is necessary for It = 0. Since ˆG D > 0, there exists
β0 ∈ (0, 1) such that (1 − q0)h/q0 = β0 ˆG D/(1 − β0). Since the sum of the other terms
on the right-hand side of (9) is positive, this implies that there exists ¯β < β0 such that
for all β ≤ ¯β (9) will be violated and thus It = 1.
For the third part, note that bureaucratic rents are equal to h/q0 − h = (1 −
q0)h/q0, which needs to be greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (9). Let
this right-hand side be denoted by θ (and note that θ > 0). If (1 − q0)h/q0 < θ , then
(9) will be violated and It = 1. This implies that we need (1 − q0)h/q0 ≥ θ > 0. Next
observe from (11) that there exists a value of (1 − q0)h/q0, say ¯θ0, such that τˆE = 1.
It is evident that when τˆE = 1, condition (13) cannot be satisfied, thus It = 1. This
implies that for It = 0, we need h/q0 ≤ ¯θ0 and thus (1 − q0)h/q0 ≤ ¯θ . 
Proof of Proposition 6. Consider a history ht ∈ Ht where party P is currently in power
and observe that the unique best response of party P is to choose its unconstrained
optimal policy. In particular, if I = 1, its unique best response is to choose the
policy vector (τ D, wD, G D, π(τ D), I = 1), where τD is as defined in Proposition 1
and wD ≡ (1 − τ D)AL + h. If I = 0, then its unique best response is to choose the
policy vector (τˆ D, w = h/q0, ˆG D, π(τˆ D), I = 1), where (τˆ D, ˆG D) are the solution to
the maximization problem in part 3 of Lemma 3. To see why no other policy vector
could be a best response, note that both of these policies involve a bureaucracy of
size less than n − 1/2 and that the unique continuation best response of any poor
non-bureaucrat is to support party P (since even with the random likelihood of being
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hired into bureaucracy, the expected utility from switching to an elite controlled regime
for a poor agent is less than the utility of permanent democracy in Proposition 1, and
individual anonymity implies that specific individuals, for example those who were
previously in bureaucracy, cannot be treated differently). Consequently, in any SPE
continuation play following this history ht , party P will remain in power, and thus
there is no reason for it to deviate from the policies that maximize its preferences (or
the utility of a representative poor agent).
Next, note that since (9) and (13) are satisfied, it is feasible to have an elite-
controlled regime making the elite better off than in permanent democracy. This
implies that the best SPE from the viewpoint of the elite will involve party R being in
power and choosing no redistribution (G = 0), and the size of bureaucracy must be X =
n − 1/2 in order to ensure electoral victory to party R. To complete the characterization
of the best SPE from the viewpoint of the elite it remains to determine the organization
of the state, I, and bureaucratic wage, w, in this equilibrium. From part 3 of Lemma 3,
if I = 0, the bureaucratic wage must be w = h/q0, and (9) and (13) imply that at this
wage, bureaucrats are happy to support party R and the elite are better off in this regime.
However, the elite may possibly obtain higher utility with X = n − 1/2, I = 1 and
some wage w∗ < h/q. To see whether this is possible, note that the minimum wage that
the elite need to pay to bureaucrats is w∗ = (1 − τ D)AL + G D + h, since otherwise
bureaucrats would be better off in democracy than under elite-controlled democracy
and would vote for party P. Condition (9) implies that w∗ is indeed strictly less than
h/q. Consequently, if it is a subgame perfect strategy for the elite to choose (I = 1, w∗),
then the best SPE will involve the policy vector (τ˜ E , w∗, G = 0, I = 1), where τ˜ E is
the tax rate that satisfies the government budget constraint and is necessarily strictly
less than τˆ E as defined in (12) since w∗ < h/q0.
We next need to check that this strategy profile is subgame perfect. Suppose
bureaucrats use the most severe punishment against elite deviation, which we next
describe. Consider a history ht where party R has always been in power (otherwise,
simply consider the part of the history where party R has been in power). Then the vote
of each bureaucrat after this history, v(B|ht ), is as follows: if ht contains wt ′ < w∗
for any t ′ ≤ t , then v(B|ht ) = P , and if ht contains wt ′ = w∗ for all t ′ ≤ t , then
v(B|ht ) = R (that is, if the wage w is ever less than w∗, then bureaucrats vote for
party P in all future periods). Given this strategy, the utility of the elite from the policy
vector (τ˜ E , w∗, G = 0, I = 1) is
(1 − τ˜ E )AH
1 − β .
Instead, if party R deviates, the best deviation is to pay the lowest wage to bureaucrats
consistent with bureaucrats not leaving the public sector (the policy vector in
Proposition 2 with the tax rate τN). After this deviation, bureaucrats vote for party P and
the allocation in Proposition 1, with the policy vector (τ D, wD, G D, π(τ D), I = 1), is
implemented thereafter, giving the elite utility
(1 − τ N )AH + β (1 − τ
D)AH + G D
1 − β .
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Therefore, choosing the policy vector (τ˜ E , w∗, G = 0, X = n − 1/2, I = 1) is
subgame perfect if
(1 − τ˜ E )AH ≥ (1 − β)(1 − τ N )AH + β[(1 − τ D)AH + G D].
This condition is similar to the second part of (13). If it is not satisfied, then the
elite cannot credibly commit to the bureaucratic wage w∗ with I = 1 and therefore
need to choose the policy vector (τˆ E , w = h/q, G = 0, X = n − 1/2, I = 0) as in
Proposition 3 (which is preferred to transitioning to permanent democracy since
condition (13) holds). Therefore, the best SPE (from the viewpoint of the elite) may
involve either the policy vector (τ˜ E , w∗, G = 0, X = n − 1/2, I = 1) or (τˆ E , w =
h/q, G = 0, X = n − 1/2, I = 0). But in both cases, it features party R being in
power, G = 0, and X = n − 1/2 as claimed in the proposition. 
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